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Moving Beyond
Crisis Management
After nearly a century of ad hoc drought management, the United States needs
a new paradigm centered on risk management.
BY DONALD A. WILHITE
T o the casual observer, it may appear that in the pastfive years, drought has been a more common visitorto the American landscape. Drought conditions rav-aged the southwestern and south-central states dur-ing 1995 and 1996, raising havoc in many economicsectors. It also caused serious environmental and so-cial hardships. Drought has persisted in each year
since, affecting most areas in the country on at least one occasion and
several regions for three or more consecutive years.
From the policy perspective, the most significant droughts may have
been the episode of 1995 and 1996, which sparked a series of initia-
tives, and the 1999 drought, which struck the eastern United States.
Extending from New England
through most of the Southeast,
this last drought persisted for
nearly 12 months from mid-1998
through late summer 1999, and
garnered considerable attention
because of its wide-ranging and
complex impacts on agriculture,
forestry, water supply, and tour-
ism and recreation.
Although drought conditions
are common in the eastern United
States, the intensity, duration, and
spatial extent of this event caused
great concern. This drought cap-
tured the attention of the major
news media in the  drought-affected
area, and they questioned whether
this region and the nation were ad-
equately prepared for extreme
drought. This drought also coin-
cided with the formation of the
National Drought Policy Commis-
sion, a partnership between fed-
eral agencies and nonfederal rep-
resentatives from tribal, munici-
pal, and other interest groups. The
Congress and the president
charged the commission with de-
termining a new direction for
drought management in the
United States–one emphasizing
risk management over crisis man-
agement.
Too Little, Too Late
D rought is normal in vir-tually all portions ofthe United States. It isa recurring, inevitable
feature of climate. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) estimates average annual
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losses because of drought in the
United States to be $6 billion to
$8 billion, more than for any other
natural hazard.1 Yet the United
States, as well as most other na-
tions, is ill-prepared to deal with
the consequences of drought.
Historically, our nation’s ap-
proach to drought management
has been to offer relief to the
affected area. These emergency re-
sponse programs are for the most
part too little, too late. More im-
portantly, drought relief does little
if anything to reduce the vulnerabil-
ity of the affected area to future
drought events. On the contrary,
considerable evidence suggests that
government relief actually increases
vulnerability to future events by in-
creasing the recipients’ dependence
on government and by encouraging
resource managers to maintain the
very strategies that place industry,
utilities, the community, and indi-
viduals at risk. Improving drought
management will require a new para-
digm, one that encourages prepared-
ness and mitigation by applying the
principles of risk management.
The lack of progress in drought
preparedness is often blamed on
constraints that are fallacious, no
longer exist, or represent only a
minor deterrent to improved
drought management.2 The argu-
ment goes that drought is unpre-
dictable; that it is hard to moni-
tor because it develops slowly; that
data on climate and water supply
are inadequate; that information
delivery systems are inadequate;
that a lack of coordination exists
between and within government
agencies responsible for monitor-
ing drought, managing water sup-
ply, and planning for and respond-
ing to drought; and that suitable
planning methodologies are un-
available.  Drought planning sys-
tematically addresses these con-
straints, whether perceived or real.
Scientists and professional or-
ganizations have issued numerous
calls for action to develop a na-
tional drought policy, but these
have produced little in the way of
progress. Yet, thanks to the Na-
tional Drought Policy Act of 19983
and the subsequent report issued
by the National Drought Policy
Commission to Congress and the
president, we now can develop a
coherent national policy that em-
phasizes drought preparedness and
mitigation.4 We are at a critical
crossroads for drought policy. Will
we continue down the road of cri-
sis management or move toward
risk management?
Profiles of Drought
D rought may be one ofthe most complex andleast understood of allnatural hazards, af-
fecting more people than any other
hazard. It is a normal feature of
climate and its recurrence is inevi-
table. Confusion about its charac-
teristics, however, has meant that
effective management in most parts
of the world has received short
shrift. Drought, in fact, is the
Rodney Dangerfield of natural
hazards; that is, it doesn’t get the
respect that other natural hazards
do, given the magnitude of its
impacts. Scientists, policymakers,
and decision makers—including
farmers and natural resource man-
agers—need a better understand-
ing of the phenomenon before try-
ing to establish plans that reduce
vulnerability for future genera-
tions.5
 Drought is different from other
natural hazards such as floods,
earthquakes, and tornadoes, which
occur swiftly and with clearly
visible results. All droughts origi-
nate from a significant reduction in
precipitation extended over a season
or longer. Humans can exacerbate
drought, however, by over-allocat-
ing water supplies so demand may
greatly exceed supply in water-short
years. Poor land management prac-
tices such as overgrazing can also de-
grade the productivity of the natu-
ral landscape, thus increasing vul-
nerability to drought.
Many definitions of drought ex-
ist, reflecting the different climatic
characteristics between regions and
the wide range of impacts that can
occur on various economic sectors
and the environment.
Droughts are commonly classi-
fied as meteorological, agricultural,
and hydrological. Meteorological
drought occurs when there is a sig-
nificant deficiency of precipitation
compared with what is normal or
expected over some extended pe-
riod of time. Agricultural drought
results when deficiencies in pre-
cipitation lead to a reduction in
soil moisture that retards plant
growth and development and, ul-
timately,  yield. Hydrological
drought, on the other hand, oc-
Drought is the Rodney Dangerfield of natural
hazards; it doesn’t get the respect that other
natural hazards do.
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curs when an extended precipita-
tion shortfall affects surface and
subsurface water supply, which is
measured by monitoring stream
flow, reservoir and lake levels, and
groundwater.
Hydrological droughts are usu-
ally out of phase with meteorologi-
cal and agricultural droughts since
a time lapse occurs between defi-
ciencies in precipitation and the
lowering of reservoirs or ground-
water. In addition, water in hydro-
logical storage systems such as res-
ervoirs and rivers is often used for
multiple and competing purposes
such as drinking water, power gen-
eration, flood control, irrigation,
and recreation. Competition for
water in these storage systems es-
calates during drought, increasing
conflicts among water users.
No wonder there’s a lack of
progress in drought management.
If scientists can’t agree on what
drought is, or how severe it is, how
can policymakers know when to
act? A meteorologist, agronomist,
and hydrologist may well pro-
vide three distinctly different re-
sponses to the question, are we in
a drought? More important, they
may all be correct.
Droughts occur more frequently
in the West and usually last longer
there, but the droughts of 1998
through 2000 have demonstrated
the vulnerability of eastern states
to severe and extended periods of
low rainfall. Yet the West is cur-
rently better equipped to manage
water supplies during extended
periods of water shortage because
of large investments in water stor-
age and transmission facilities. Pre-
cisely because the eastern states
have fewer droughts, the region is
generally less prepared to mitigate
and respond to its effects.
Drought differs from other
natural hazards in several critical
ways, which complicates monitor-
ing, impact assessment, mitiga-
tion, and response. First, drought
is a slow-onset, creeping, natural
hazard, so it’s hard to determine
when it begins and ends. Its ef-
fects often accumulate slowly over
a considerable period of time and
may linger for years after the event
is over. Scientists and policymakers
continue to debate the criteria for
declaring an end to a drought.
Second, the absence of a precise
and universally accepted definition
of drought adds to the confusion
about whether or not a drought
exists and, if it does, its degree of
severity. Realistically, definitions
of drought must be specific to re-
gions and impacts.
Third, drought does not affect
buildings, roads, and other struc-
tures, and it is more geographically
widespread than other natural haz-
ards.
These peculiar characteristics of
drought make quantifying its im-
pacts and providing disaster relief
far more difficult than for other
natural hazards. The National
Drought Mitigation Center, how-
ever, recently determined that for
the 48 contiguous states, severe
and extreme drought affected more
than 25 percent of the country in
27 of the past 100 years. During
the drought of 1934, more than
60 percent of the 48 contiguous
states experienced severe or extreme
drought conditions.
Human Component
M any people considerdrought to be largelya natural or phys-ical event. In reality,
drought, like other natural haz-
ards, has both a natural and a so-
cial component, and human activ-
ity can either mitigate or worsen
the physical effects. Of course, we
can’t change the weather, or me-
teorological drought, which oc-
curs through persistent large-scale
disruptions in the global circula-
tion pattern of the atmosphere.
But we can change some of the
social factors that determine our
vulnerability to drought.
Our population is not only in-
creasing but also shifting from
humid to more arid climates—
such as from the Northeast and
Midwest to the Sunbelt and the
western states—and from rural to
urban settings.  Urban growth
strains limited water supplies and
water supply systems, especially
during periods of peak demand.
An increasingly urbanized popu-
lation is also increasing conflict
between agricultural and urban
water users, a trend that will only
be exacerbated in the future.
As the population increases, so
does pressure on natural resources.
To improve drought management,
we need to use natural resources
in a more sustainable manner. This
will require a partnership between
individuals and government. Fur-
ther complicating the picture, in
the future the effects of drought
will fall harder on some economic
Drought, like other natural hazards, has both a
natural and a social component, and human activity
can either mitigate or worsen the physical effects.
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sectors, population groups, and re-
gions.  Greater awareness of our
environment and the need to pre-
serve and restore environmental
quality is placing greater pressure
on all of us to be better stewards
of natural and biological resources.
One thing is certain: continu-
ing to address the effects of
drought in a reactive, crisis-man-
agement mode will do little to re-
duce the impacts of these events
in the future. In fact, this approach
has been shown to increase vulner-
ability to drought in the long term
because it increases dependence on
government, which, in turn, de-
creases self-reliance. If the govern-
ment continues to bail out the
people most affected by drought,
they will have no incentive to
adopt methods to protect the natu-
ral resource base.
In arid and semi-arid Australia,
the best land managers have
learned that foresight and plan-
ning can lessen the devastating ef-
fects of inevitable long dry spells.
By applying appropriate farm
management practices, farmers can
reduce many of the risks associated
with drought, thus minimizing
their losses.6 Drought relief in
Australia is now provided only
during exceptional drought con-
ditions. In the United States, how-
ever, the recipients of drought re-
lief are typically those who do not
implement appropriate manage-
ment strategies when faced with
impending drought or those who
manage the land resource in
nonsustainable ways by overgraz-
ing, planting inappropriate crops,
applying inappropriate t i l lage
practices, or storing inadequate re-
serves of fodder for livestock. Ur-
ban areas may seek federal or state
grants or loans when water sup-
plies are at risk when, in fact, long-
range planning during a non-
drought period could have averted
or reduced the risk.
Should society subsidize poor
land and water managers or reward
those who plan ahead or adopt ap-
propriate management practices?
Risk management is aimed at the
latter—crisis management, the
former. The implementation of a
national drought policy in Austra-
lia in 1992 changed that nation’s
approach to drought management.
(See “Water Policy Adrift” in this is-
sue of FORUM.) We should learn
from their experience.
Mitigating Disaster
I n the absence of a coherentnational drought-manage-ment strategy, an increasingnumber of states have
stepped in to fill the void, creating
their own drought plans during the
past two decades.7 In 1982, only
three states had drought plans in
place. By 2000, 30 states had de-
veloped plans and six states were at
various stages of developing a plan.
The basic goal of state drought
plans should be to improve the ef-
fectiveness of preparedness and re-
sponse efforts by enhancing moni-
toring and early warning, risk and
impact assessment, and mitigation
and response.
Plans should also contain pro-
visions to improve coordination
within agencies of state govern-
ment and between local and fed-
eral government. Initially, drought
plans largely focused on response
efforts; today the trend is for states
to place greater emphasis on miti-
gation as the fundamental element
of a drought plan. Enhancing
monitoring and early warning sys-
tems and conducting comprehen-
sive risk assessments of vulnerable
population groups, economic sec-
tors, and areas are key components
of the planning process.
Other mitigation strategies in-
clude public education, conflict
resolution actions among water
users, and measures that augment
supply and manage demand.
Texas, for example, is developing
a statewide drought plan that in-
cludes a requirement for local com-
munities to develop drought plans.
Georgia’s drought plan will in-
clude a state framework with a se-
ries of more specific regional plans,
such as for the metro Atlanta area
and the Flint River basin.
Utah and Nebraska have revised
their plans to further emphasize
mitigation, and Colorado is in the
revision process. New Mexico,
which first developed a drought
plan in 1998, now has mitigation
as the primary ingredient of its
plan. Texas, Hawaii, and Georgia
are following a similar course. As
states gain more experience with
drought planning and mitigation
actions, the trend toward mitiga-
tion is expected to continue.
Initially, states were slow to de-
velop drought plans because the
planning process was unfamiliar.
If the government continues to bail out the people
most affected by drought, they will have no
incentive to protect the natural resource base.
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With the development of drought
planning models and the availabil-
ity of a greater number of plans
for comparison, drought planning
has become a less mysterious pro-
cess.8 As states initiate the plan-
ning process, they first study the
drought plans of other states to
compare methodology and orga-
nizational structure.
The rapid adoption of drought
plans is also a clear indication of
their benefits. Drought plans pro-
vide the framework for improved
coordination within and between
levels of government. Compre-
hensive, integrated early warning
and monitoring systems enhance
the delivery of information to de-
cision makers at all levels. Many
states now use the Internet to dis-
seminate information to decision
makers as well as to businesses,
farmers, the banks that provide
loans to farmers, and individual
homeowners.  These websites
provide current information on
drought severity, water-use re-
strictions, water conservation rec-
ommendations, key contacts with-
in state and federal agencies, and
other timely information.
Through drought plans, the
risks associated with drought can
be better defined and addressed
with active mitigation and re-
sponse programs. The planning
process also allows the numerous
stakeholders to be involved early
and often in plan development.
This increases the probability that
conflicts between water users will
not escalate during times of short-
age. All of these actions can help
to improve public awareness of the
importance of water management
and the value of protecting our
limited water resources.
Leading the Way
With the tremendousadvances in droughtplanning at the statelevel in recent years,
it should come as no surprise that
states have been extremely frus-
trated with the lack of progress at
the federal level. Early into the
1995-1996 drought, the lack of
leadership and coordination at the
federal level quickly became obvi-
ous, as attempts to access drought
assistance programs were unsuc-
cessful because federal programs
had been discontinued, were
underfunded, or in some cases had
not received appropriations from
Congress.
Unlike other natural disasters
where Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) provides
leadership and coordinates federal
response efforts, there is no lead
federal agency for drought pro-
grams. This failure of leadership
continued in later droughts. Re-
cent initiatives toward developing
a national drought policy are the
direct result of those frustrations.
A national drought policy
should establish a clear set of prin-
ciples to govern the management
of drought and its impacts. The
policy should be consistent and
equitable for all regions, popula-
tion groups, and economic sectors
and consistent with the goals of
sustainable development.
Drought policy should empha-
size risk management through the
application of preparedness and
mitigation. In advance of drought,
planning needs to be encouraged
at all levels of government, moni-
toring and early warning systems
must be integrated and improved,
risk assessments should be con-
ducted, and mitigation actions
and programs should be identified
and implemented. These actions
will increase the level of readiness
and improve operational and in-
stitutional capabilities for respond-
ing to a drought. Mitigation—
short-term and long-term actions,
programs, or policies imple-
mented during and in advance of
drought—reduces the degree of
risk to human life, property, and
productivity.
Emergency response, however,
will always be a part of drought
management since we cannot
avoid or reduce all potential im-
pacts through mitigation pro-
grams. In addition, it is probable
that a future drought will exceed
the drought of record and, there-
fore, the capacity of a region to
respond.
Emergency response should be
used sparingly, however, and only
in a way that supports long-term
goals and objectives.
A national drought policy should
also reduce risk by developing
better awareness and understanding
of the hazard and the underlying
causes of societal vulnerability. A
risk-management approach pro-
motes improved forecasts as well as
integrated monitoring and early
warning systems, encourages pre-
paredness plans and mitigation
programs at various levels of gov-
ernment, and supports a safety net
Unlike other natural disasters, there is no lead
federal agency for drought programs.
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of emergency response programs
that ensure timely and targeted
relief.
Sense of Urgency
Calls for action on droughtpolicy and plan develop-ment in the United Statesdate back to at least the
late 1970s. Today, the federal
government’s failure to adequately
address the spiraling impacts of
drought has provoked a growing
number of calls for action.
Clearly, the traditional, reactive,
cris is  management approach,
which has relied on ad hoc inter-
agency committees that are
quickly disbanded following the
end of a drought, isn’t working.
The lessons—the successes and
failures—of these responses have
quickly been forgotten, and the
failures are simply repeated with
the next event.
In response, a number of state
organizations, scientific panels,
and federal agencies—including
the Western Governors’ Policy Of-
fice, General Accounting Office,
National Academy of Sciences,
Great Lakes Commission, Inter-
state Council on Water Policy, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency,
American Meteorological Society,
Office of Technology Assessment,
FEMA, Western Governors’ Asso-
ciation, and Western Water Policy
Review Advisory Commission—
have issued calls for action.9 The
diversity of these stakeholders il-
lustrates the extent of drought’s
impact on the economy and envi-
ronment and the growing concern
over the ineffectiveness of prior
response efforts to address the
complex, spiral ing impacts of
drought in a timely and equitable
fashion.
More recently, in response to
the severe impacts of drought in
1996, FEMA was directed to chair
a multi-state task force to address
the drought situation in the South-
west and southern Great Plains
states. The purpose of the task
force was to coordinate the federal
response to problems in the
drought-stricken region by iden-
tifying needs,  applicable pro-
grams, and program barriers. The
task force was also directed to sug-
gest ways to improve drought man-
agement through short- and long-
term national actions.
The final report contained sev-
eral important long-term recom-
mendations.
First, the task force called for the
development of a national drought
policy based on the philosophy of
cooperation with state and local
stakeholders. This policy should
include a national climate and
drought monitoring system to pro-
vide early warning of the onset and
severity of drought to federal,
state, and local officials.
Second, the task force suggested
that a regional forum be created
to assess regional needs and re-
sources, identify critical areas and
interests,  provide reliable and
timely information, and coordinate
state actions.
Third, the task force asked
FEMA to include drought as one
of the natural hazards addressed
in the National Mitigation Strat-
egy, given the substantial costs as-
sociated with its occurrence and
the numerous opportunities avail-
able to mitigate its effects.
Fourth, states strongly requested
that a single federal agency be ap-
pointed to coordinate drought pre-
paredness and response.
The drought of 1996 also spurred
development of a drought task force
under the leadership of the West-
ern Governors’ Association. Formed
in June 1996 as a result of a resolu-
tion offered by Governor Gary
Johnson of New Mexico, the task
force emphasized the importance
of a comprehensive, integrated
drought response.
The task force made several im-
portant recommendations. First, a
national drought policy is needed
to integrate actions and responsi-
bilities among all levels of govern-
ment. The policy should empha-
size preparedness, response, and
mitigation measures.
Second, states should develop
contingency plans to provide early
warning of drought to stakehold-
ers, short- and long-term mitiga-
tion and response programs, along
with triggers for the start-up and
shut-down of these programs.
Third, a regional drought coor-
dinating council should be created
to develop sustainable policy,
monitor drought conditions, as-
sess state-level responses, identify
impacts and issues for resolution,
and work in partnership with the
federal government to address
drought-related needs.
Fourth, a federal interagency
coordinating group should be es-
tablished with a designated lead
agency for drought coordination
with states and regional agencies.
Clearly, the traditional, reactive, crisis
management approach isn’t working.
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The FEMA and Western Gov-
ernors’ Association reports have
spurred a number of important
policy initiatives. In early 1997,
FEMA, Western Governors’ Asso-
ciation, the Small Business Ad-
ministration, and the U.S. depart-
ments of Agriculture, Interior, and
Commerce signed a memorandum
of understanding calling for a part-
nership among federal, state, lo-
cal, and tribal governments to re-
duce drought impacts in the west-
ern United States. This MOU
resulted in the following actions:
n The formation of the Western
Drought Coordination Council to
address the recommendations of
the western governors;
n The designation of the USDA as
the lead federal agency for drought,
to carry out the objectives of the
MOU; and
n The establishment by USDA of
a federal interagency drought co-
ordinating group.
Concurrently, the Western Wa-
ter Policy Review Advisory Com-
mission, created by the Western
Water Policy Act of 1992, reexam-
ined western water policy.10 One
of the reports published by the
commission summarized recom-
mendations from recent studies on
drought management that should
be incorporated in future attempts
to integrate drought management
and water policy in the West.11
The consensus of these studies
emphasized the need to create a
national drought policy and a na-
tional climate-monitoring system
in support of that policy, as well
as to develop state drought miti-
gation plans. Although impacts
of drought occur mainly at the lo-
cal, state, and regional level, this
study concluded that it was im-
perative for the federal government
to provide the leadership necessary
to improve the way the nation
prepares for and responds to
drought.
The severe drought of 1996 and
the initiatives it inspired also led
Senator Pete Domenici and Con-
gressman Joe Skeen of New Mexico
to introduce the National Drought
Policy Act of 1998 in Congress. This
bill created the National Drought
Policy Commission to “provide
advice and recommendations on
creation of an integrated, coordi-
nated Federal policy designed to
prepare for and respond to serious
drought emergencies.”
In a report submitted to Con-
gress and the president in May
2000, the National Drought
Policy Commission recommended
that the United States establish a
national drought policy emphasiz-
ing preparedness. The goals of this
policy would be to:
n Incorporate planning, imple-
mentation of plans and mitigation
measures, risk management, re-
source stewardship, environmen-
tal considerations, and public edu-
cation as key elements of an
effective national drought policy;
n Improve collaboration among sci-
entists and managers to enhance
observation networks, monitoring,
prediction, information delivery,
and applied research, as well as
foster public understanding of and
preparedness for drought;
n Develop and incorporate com-
prehensive insurance and financial
strategies into drought prepared-
ness plans;
n Maintain a safety net of emer-
gency relief that emphasizes sound
stewardship of natural resources
and self-help; and
n Coordinate drought programs
and resources effectively and effi-
ciently and in a customer-oriented
manner.
The National Drought Policy
Commission further recommended
creation of a long-term National
Drought Council composed of fed-
eral and nonfederal members to
implement the recommendations of
the commission. The commission
further recommended that Congress
designate the secretary of Agricul-
ture as co-chair of the Council, with
a nonfederal co-chair to be elected
by the nonfederal council members.
In late 2000, Secretary of Agricul-
ture Dan Glickman established an
interim National Drought Council,
pending action on a permanent
council by the U.S. Congress.
The true legacy of the 1995-
1996 drought is not likely to be
its economic, environmental, and
social  impacts,  but rather the
policy initiatives that occurred in
the post-drought period. These
initiatives appear to be changing
the way droughts are viewed, and
they may change the way droughts
are managed in the United States.
The real question is whether these
changes will result in permanent
and substantive modifications in
the way government entities deal
with drought.
A national drought policy is needed to integrate
actions and responsibilities among all levels of
government.
Spring 2001 n 27
Cloudy Future
D rought is a normal partof climate for essen-tially all regions of theUnited States. Like-
wise, drought relief has become a
common feature of the national
landscape. Shaped over the course
of the past century and a half, this
relief occurs primarily under a di-
verse, complex, confusing, and
poorly coordinated ensemble of
federal programs. It is reactive and
does little to lessen the risks asso-
ciated with future droughts. It is
becoming increasingly clear that
current land and water-supply
management practices are not sus-
tainable in the long term, espe-
cially given the variability of cli-
mate and the increasing demand
on natural resources.
Although state and federal at-
tention to improving drought
management in the United States
has been copious in recent years,
including the National Drought
Policy Act of 1998, little change
in practice is visible to date, espe-
cially at the federal level. Federal
response to drought conditions in
1999 and 2000 was reactive and
short-term in scope—in other
words, business as usual. To fill the
vacuum, states have continued to
be the most progressive actors in
drought management, a trend
that began in the early to mid-
1980s. Regardless of progress by
states, improved drought manage-
ment requires an integrated ap-
proach between and within levels
of government.
True, federal agencies are now
speaking the new language of
drought management, and phrases
like “improved coordination and
cooperation,” “increased emphasis
on mitigation and preparedness,”
and “building nonfederal/federal
partnerships” have become com-
monplace. Nevertheless, the men-
tality of most state and federal
government agencies remains re-
sponse oriented.
Existing institutional inertia of
federal emergency response pro-
grams and the expectations of the
recipients of assistance programs,
however, encourage drought man-
agement to remain in a reactive,
crisis-management mode. It is not
yet apparent whether federal and
state policymakers clearly under-
stand the scope of the changes that
will be required to invoke the new
paradigm of risk management.
When drought occurs, especially
in election years, drought relief is
one method that members of Con-
gress use to send money home to
their constituents.
The true test of whether we are
making progress will be if Congress
and the administration enthusias-
tically embrace the recommenda-
tions of the National Drought
Policy Commission and other
groups, provide adequate funding
to support commission goals and
recommendations, and direct fed-
eral agencies to modify existing
policies and programs to empha-
size mitigation and preparedness.
If they do, they will shift funding
from crisis to risk management and
implement the new paradigm.
Only time will determine the
dedication of the nation to this
new approach to drought manage-
ment. A continuation of wide-
spread, severe drought in the next
few years would certainly engen-
der greater support for this new
paradigm and help us continue
down the path to risk manage-
ment. The political will to change
the way we manage drought ap-
pears to be genuine but may
evaporate quickly if we experience
a series of wet years. Changing the
momentum of the past will be dif-
ficult, but it is critical for the sci-
entific community and the public
to hold policymakers to this com-
mitment.n
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